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Abstract—Runtime enforcement aims at verifying the active 
execution trace of executing software against formally specified 
properties of the software, and enforcing the properties in case 
that they are violated in the active execution trace. Enforcement 
mechanism of individual properties may interfere with each 
other, causing the overall behavior of the executing software to 
be erroneous. As the number and the complexity of the 
properties to be enforced increase, manual detection of the 
inferences becomes an error-prone and effort-consuming task. 
Hence, we aim at providing a framework for automatic detection 
of interferences. As the initial steps to create such a framework, 
in this paper we first provide formal definitions of an 
enforcement mechanism and enforcement operators. Second, we 
define a rule set to detect the interference among properties.  
Runtime Enforcement; Interference Rules; Automatic 
Interference Detection; * 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Reliability is the ability of a software system to perform its 
required functions under stated conditions for a specified 
period [1]. It can be attained via different techniques among 
which we are interested in applying the runtime enforcement 
technique [2] to ensure functional correctness of the software. 
Runtime enforcement is the process of checking whether the active 
execution trace of software adheres to given properties of the 
software, and enforcing the properties by modifying the 
execution trace of the software in case that the properties are 
not satisfied by the executing software.  
Complex software has multiple properties to be verified and 
enforced at runtime. According to the separation of concerns 
principle, the properties may be specified individually; hence, 
they are also verified and enforced individually by most of the 
existing approaches [2-7]. However, since the enforcement of 
the properties may interfere with each other the individual 
verification and enforcement of the properties does not 
necessarily guarantee the overall correctness of the executing 
software. For example, assume that to enforce the property A, 
we must invoke the method m; whereas enforcement of the 
property B may prevent the execution of m. Hence, the 
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enforcement of B interferes with the enforcement of A, causing 
the overall behavior of the executing software to be erroneous.  
In [8, 9], a language to compose the runtime enforcement 
mechanisms in a non-interfering way is provided; but, the 
developer must manually detect the interferences. However, as 
the number of properties for complex software increase, we 
believe that manual detection of the interferences become an 
effort-consuming and error-prone activity for the developer.  
In this paper, we aim at providing a framework to 
automatically detect the interference of enforcement 
mechanisms. As the initial steps to create such a framework, 
we provide a formal definition of a runtime enforcement 
mechanism along with our enforcement operators; and we 
define a rule set to reason about possible interferences among 
the properties. The rules can further be used to develop a tool 
for automatic detection of the interferences.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, 
our running example and the inference problem among the 
properties are explained. In section III, we provide a formal 
definition of an enforcement mechanism, our enforcement 
operators, and our rule set to detect the interference. Finally, 
section IV discusses the conclusions and future work.  
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Usually, for complex software multiple properties, which 
are developed incrementally or even by different groups, must 
be enforced at runtime. Generally, the enforcement 
mechanisms of the properties can interfere with each other. In 
subsection A we provide an example of such software; and in 
subsection B, we provide examples of such properties which 
interfere in complex ways. 
A. Running Example 
The example software, whose runtime behavior is to be 
verified, is a media player called MPlayer [10]. MPlayer is 
composed of several interacting components and is executed as 
two threads, so-called UI and Core. Fig.1 provides an overall 
view of MPlayer components and their interactions in handling 
the user’s request of playing a media file. The component User 
Interface receives the command Play along with the media file 
name from the user; and writes the command in Command 
Buffer by invoking the method WriteCmd. The component 
MPCore first reads the buffered command by invoking the 
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method ReadPlayCmd on Command Buffer, then it invokes the 
method OpenStream on the component Streaming. 
Consequently, the component Streaming creates a file-handler 
for the media file and checks that the media file is not 
corrupted. Afterwards, until the end of the media file is 
reached, MPCore repeats the following five steps: 1) it reads 
chunks of media file by invoking the method ReadChunk on 
Streaming. 2) It separates the video and audio streams of the 
media chunk. 3) It invokes the method PlayAudio on Audio 
Processor to send the audio stream to the audio output. 4) It 
invokes the method DecodeVideo on Video Processor to 
decode the video stream; and 5) it invokes the method 
PlayVideo on Video Processor to play the video stream. After 
playing all media chunks, MPCore invokes the method 
CloseStream on Streaming.  
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Figure 1.  An overall view of MPlayer architecture  
B. Interference of Runtime Enforcement Mechanisms  
Assume that we want to ensure that the requested media file 
is being played correctly by enforcing the following property at 
runtime:  
- P1: All of the specified method executions for the 
thread Core must occur according to the specified 
order in Fig.1; otherwise, the execution of methods 
which are invoked out of order must be prevented.  
To enforce P1, we make use of an existing runtime 
verification system, for example MOP [4]. Fig.2 shows a 
specification of P1 in the language of MOP. For the sake of 
brevity some details of the MOP language are omitted.  Here, 
line 1 specifies that the event ev_ReadPlayCmd occurs before 
each execution of the method ReadPlayCmd. Likewise, lines 2 
to 8 define the events corresponding to the other method 
executions. Line 9 defines the expected sequence of executions 
as a predicate in extended regular expression (ERE). Line 10 
specifies that the execution of an invoked method must be 
prevented when the specified extended regular expression is 
violated.  
Assume that the MPlayer functionality is extended to 
support new video codecs whose video streams often become 
out of synch with their audio streams. Hence, in addition to P1, 
the developer wants to enforce the property P2.  
- P2: The audio and video streams can become out of 
synch; however, their timing difference must not be 
more than ± d milliseconds. If this property is violated, 
playing the media file must be restarted from the 
beginning. 
1. event ev_ReadCmd before: execution(* ReadPlayCmd(..)){} 
2. event ev_OpenStream before : execution (* OpenStream(..)){} 
3. event ev_CloseStream before : execution (* CloseStream(..)){} 
4. event ev_NotEoFndOfMedia before : execution (* 
NotEndOfMedia (..)){} 
5. event ev_ReadChunk before : execution (* ReadChunk (..)){} 
6. event ev_PlayAudio before  : execution (* PlayAudio(..)){} 
7. event ev_DecodeVideo before  : execution (* DecodeVideo(..)){} 
8. event ev_PlayVideo before  : execution (* PlayVideo(..)){} 
9. ERE:   ev_ReadCmd  ev_OpenStream (ev_NotEndOfMedia  
              ev_ReadChunk ev_PlayAudio ev_DecodeVideo  
                ev_PlayVideo)* ev_CloseStream 
10. violation { //prevent the execution}  
Figure 2.  A specification of P1 in MOP 
Fig.3 defines P2 using the raw-specification language of 
MOP. Line 1 defines and initializes the monitoring variable d. 
Line 2 specifies that the event ev_DecodeVideo occurs before 
each execution of the method DecodeVideo. Line 3 specifies 
that upon occurrence of this event, the method 
CalculateDifference, which is implemented in the component 
MPCore, must be invoked to calculate the difference between 
audio and video timers. Line 4 verifies whether the difference 
is within the accepted range of ± d; if the difference is not 
within this range, playing of the current media file is stopped 
and restarted by invoking the methods CloseStream and 
OpenStream in order. 
1. float d = 40.0;  
2. event ev_DecodeVideo before : execution(* DecodeVideo(..)) { 
3.    float diff = MPCore.CalculateDifference(); 
4.     if ( abs(diff) >= d ) {CloseStream(); OpenStream(); } 
5.  } 
Figure 3.  A specification of P2 in MOP 
Here, the properties P1 and P2 are enforced individually; 
however, their individual enforcement does not necessarily 
guarantee the overall correctness of the software. For example, 
assume that at some point during the execution of MPlayer, the 
method DecodeVideo and all other expected methods before it 
have been invoked in the expected order; hence according to 
P1, the method PlayVideo (the event ev_PlayVideo) must be 
invoked (must occur) next. The invocation of DecodeVideo 
also causes the verification of P2 to start. If the video and audio 
streams are not synchronized, P2 invokes CloseStream and 
OpenStream and consequently the events ev_CloseStream and 
ev_OpenStream occur. However, the occurrences of these 
events violate P1 which expects ev_PlayVideo as the next 
event. Hence, the enforcement mechanism of P1 prevents the 
executions of CloseStream and OpenStream and MPlayer 
keeps playing a media file while the video and the audio 
streams are not synchronized.  
As the complexity and the number of properties increase, 
the probability that the enforcement mechanisms interfere with 
each other also increases. Hence, the runtime enforcement tools 
must provide means to detect the interferences and possibly 
resolve them. Although several runtime enforcement tools have 
been developed [2-7], to the best of our knowledge, the 
interference of enforcement mechanisms is only elaborated by 
[8,9] in the security domain. In [8,9], the developer must 
manually detect the interferences, but a language to define the 
rules for resolving the interferences is provided. However, as 
the number of properties for complex software increase, we 
believe that manual detection of the interferences becomes an 
effort-consuming and error-prone activity for the developer. 
Therefore, it is required to investigate on automatic detection 
of the interferences.  
III. DETECTING THE INTERFERENCES OF RUNTIME 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
In this section, first, we provide a formal definition of an 
enforcement mechanism and our enforcement operators, and 
then we explain our rule set to detect interferences of 
enforcement mechanisms.  
A. Enforcement Mechanism and Operators 
At a high-level of abstraction, we define the execution trace 
of finite software as a sequence of states s0, s1, s2,…,sn in which 
si (i < n) corresponds to the execution of a method in the 
software; and sn depicts end of execution of the software.  
A property P is a predicate over the states of the software in 
formalism such as regular expression, temporal logic or 
propositional logic. Runtime enforcement evaluates the 
property P against the states’ changes of the executing software 
and specifies the next state (i.e. the next method expected to be 
executed) in the software execution according to results of the 
verification. An enforcement mechanism E for the property P 
is defined as the tuple (åf, åo, f, O, δ) in which:  
· åf is the finite set of method names over which the 
predicate P is defined; hence, are verified by E. 
· åo is the finite set of method names which are enforced 
by E. At least all the members åf of must be enforced 
by E; hence, åo is a superset of åf.   
· f Î  åf depicts the method which is about to be 
executed.  
· O is the finite set of enforcement operators. The 
elements of this list is chosen from the following 
possible operators:   
- CONTINUE: allows the execution of f to be 
carried out by the executing software. Hence, E 
does not change the execution of the software. 
- RETURN: prevents f to be executed. 
- DISPATCH: prevents f to be executed, but 
invokes kÎåo instead.  
- INVOKE: before executing f, it invokes kÎåo; 
and after the execution of k, it continues with the 
execution of f. 
- HALT: terminates the execution of the software. 
· δ: f → O ´  åo is a function which verifies f against the 
property P and enforces an action.  
B. A Rule Set for Interference Detection  
Assume that A and B are enforcement mechanisms for the 
properties P1 and P2. We say that A interferes with B, if A 
violates/validates the property P2 that is individually 
satisfied/unsatisfied by the executing software. We reason 
about the interference of A and B with the following rules:  
· If åoA ∩ åfB =f , since the set of enforced methods by 
A is disjoint from the set of verified methods by B, 
there is no interference between A and B.  
· If åoA ∩ åfB = φ, since the set of enforced methods by 
A is not disjoint from the set of verified methods by B, 
A and B interfere if the following cases occur for the 
method α Î φ: 
- $ m Î  åfA , δA (m) → (INVOKE, α) or δA (m) → 
(DISPATCH, α): Here before the execution of m, 
the enforcement mechanism A calls the method α. 
Assume that the software originally does not 
contain an invocation to α; hence, B verifies α 
which is invoked from inside A. In this case, A 
causes P2 to be validated.  
- $ m Î åfA, δA (m) → (INVOKE, α) or δA (m) → 
(DISPATCH, α), and δB (α) → (RETURN, α) or 
$ β Î  åoB, δB (α) → (DISPATCH, β): Here, A 
calls the method α, but B prevents α to be 
executed; causing P1 to be violated.  
- δA (α) → (RETURN, α) or $ β Î  åoA, δA (α) → 
(DISPATCH, β): Here, A prevents the method α 
to be executed; and B does not get the chance to 
verify α. In this case, we cannot precisely 
determine if P2 is satisfied or unsatisfied by the 
software.  
· $ m Î åfA, δA (m) → (HALT, nil): since the execution 
of software is terminated by A, the enforcement of B 
cannot also continue. In this case, we cannot precisely 
conclude that the executing software satisfies or 
unsatisfies P2.  
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
In this paper, we discussed the problem of interfering 
enforcement mechanisms, which causes the overall behavior of 
the software to be erroneous. As the number and the 
complexity of properties to be enforced at runtime increases, 
manual detection of the interferences becomes an error-prone 
and effort-consuming task for the developers. Hence, we aim at 
providing a framework for automatic detection of the 
interferences. As the initial step to have such a framework, we 
provide a formal definition of a runtime enforcement 
mechanism and our enforcement operators; along with a rule 
set to detect the interferences.  
As the future work, we would like to develop a tool based 
on our rule set for automatic detection of the interferences. 
After detecting the interferences, we must also provide a means 
to resolve the interferences. Therefore, we aim at proposing a 
specification language that provides special constructs to 
compose the enforcement mechanisms in a non-interfering 
way. 
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